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The UK market for energy service contracts is expanding, owing in part to the emergence of inter-
mediaries for those contracts in different parts of the public sector. These intermediaries combine a legal
framework for establishing contracts with an organisational framework that facilitates contract nego-
tiation and execution. This paper examines the nature and operation of these intermediaries in more
detail, including their achievements to date and their similarities and differences. It uses ideas from
transaction cost economics to develop a theoretical model of the contracting decision and shows how
intermediary organisations can lower the transaction costs incurred by both clients and contractors,
thereby increasing the viability of contracting. The paper argues that intermediaries can play an im-
portant role in expanding the market for energy service contracts, and hence in delivering cost-effective
energy efﬁciency improvements throughout the public sector.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Energy service contracts (ESCs) involve the outsourcing one or
more energy-related services to a third party, or contractor –
commonly termed an energy service company (ESCO) (Fawkes,
2007; Marino et al., 2011; Sorrell, 2005, 2007). Typically, an energy
service contract guarantees a speciﬁed level of energy savings over
a period of several years, with the capital investment being ﬁ-
nanced from the associated energy cost savings. By unlocking the
potential for cost-effective energy efﬁciency improvements, ESCs
can enable clients to reduce operating costs, transfer risk, upgrade
assets, improved comfort, increase employee productivity and
concentrate attention on core activities (Sorrell, 2007). By speci-
fying outputs (e.g. energy savings) rather than inputs (e.g. speciﬁc
technologies), energy service contracts can encourage ﬂexibility
and provide the contractor with ongoing incentives to optimise
equipment performance. And by cost-effectively reducing energyr Ltd. This is an open access article
.demand and associated emissions, ESC's can contribute towards
public policy objectives in the area of energy security and sus-
tainability (Marino et al., 2011; Steinberger et al., 2009; Vine,
2005).
The UK market for energy service contracts is relatively large by
European standards, but is concentrated a limited number of
sectors and types of sites and is primarily focused upon well-es-
tablished energy efﬁcient technologies with high rates of return
(Bertoldi et al., 2014; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). Split incentives
between landlords and tenants provide a major obstacle to market
growth in the commercial sector, but the public sector market is
expanding, owing to the emergence of public procurement fra-
meworks for energy service contracts (PPFs). This term is used
here to refer to both the legal frameworks for establishing energy
service contracts in particular parts of the public sector and the
organisations that have been established to implement those fra-
meworks. The latter act as intermediaries between individual
clients and contractors, facilitating the tendering process and the
subsequent negotiation and execution of contracts (Bleyl et al.,
2013). These intermediaries are playing an increasingly importantunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Energy supply versus energy performance contracts.
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other EU Member States (Bleyl et al., 2013; Polzin et al., 2016a). But
to date, the role of intermediaries in this market has received re-
latively little attention from researchers.
This paper therefore examines the nature and operation of the
UK PPFs in more detail, including their inﬂuence on the economics
of energy service contracting, their achievements to date and their
implications for energy and climate policy. The analysis is based
upon archival documents and 23 semi-structured interviews with
key stakeholders in the UK energy service market.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces energy
service contracts, summarises the steps required to establish such
a contract and uses concepts from transaction cost economics to
explain the contracting decision. Section 3 brieﬂy summarises the
empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the ﬁndings, including
the processes through which intermediaries can lower the trans-
action costs of contracting and the experience to date with the
intermediaries operating in the UK. Section 5 concludes by
drawing lessons for public policy and the future development of
the energy service market.2. Background
2.1. Energy service contracts
An energy service contract involves the outsourcing of one or
more energy-related activities at a site or group of sites under the
terms and conditions of a long-term contract. The contract may
encompass the delivery of one or more ‘useful energy streams’
such as steam, hot water and electricity, and/or the provision of
one or more ‘ﬁnal energy services’ such as thermal comfort and
illumination (Fig. 1) (Sorrell, 2005). Contracts that focus primarily
on the former are commonly termed energy supply contracts
while those that focus primarily on the latter are commonly
termed energy performance contracts - although this terminology
is not standardised and many contracts encompass both (Bertoldi
et al., 2006; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016; Sorrell, 2007).1 Payments1 According to the EU Energy Efﬁciency Directive (Council of the European
Union, 2012): “… Energy performance contracting means a contractual arrange-
ment between the beneﬁciary and the provider of an energy efﬁciency improve-
ment measure, veriﬁed and monitored during the whole term of the contract,
where investments….in that measure are paid for in relation to a contractually
agreed level of energy efﬁciency improvement or other agreed energy performanceare normally linked to the energy and cost savings achieved re-
lative to an agreed baseline, thereby providing the contractor with
an incentive to maintain and improve equipment performance
over time. The contract may also guarantee the delivery of parti-
cular levels of energy or cost savings, thereby transferring much of
the technical and ﬁnancial risk of the associated investment to the
contractor.
Energy service contracts vary in terms of what technologies and
systems they include (e.g. boilers, CHP, lighting, cooling, building
controls, motors, building fabric etc.), how they include them (e.g.
who has responsibility for design, engineering, ﬁnancing, pur-
chasing, installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance,
monitoring, veriﬁcation etc.), and how they ﬁnance the required
investment (e.g. working capital from the client or contractor,
loans from ﬁnancial institutions, equity from risk investors or a
combination of these) (Fawkes, 2007; Hansen et al., 2009; Sorrell,
2005, 2007; Vine, 2005). Of particular importance is whether the
investment is ﬁnanced through debt taken on by the client and
hence appears on the client’s balance sheet, or whether the in-
vestment is ﬁnanced by the contractor. With larger projects, len-
der security may be conﬁned to the assets of the project rather
than those of the client or contractor.
Table 1 summarises some of the activities required for a client
to establish an energy service contract (DECC, 2015b). The process
typically requires the client to invest considerable staff time and
resources; to employ a range of different skills (e.g. technical,
project management, ﬁnancial, legal) that may not be readily
available in-house; and to coordinate the activities of a number of
departments that may have competing interests (Bleyl et al., 2013;
Polzin et al., 2016a). Many potential clients will lack the resources
and expertise to conduct such a process, while others will consider
that the costs involved are likely to outweigh the associated
beneﬁts. In the public sector, the obligations imposed by public
procurement legislation may create an additional obstacle to
contracting (OGC, 2008). Potential clients may also consider that
their lack of expertise, coupled with the difﬁculties of monitoring
contract performance, leaves them vulnerable to a ‘bad deal’. As a
consequence, the (anticipated) ‘transaction costs’ of establishing
energy service contracts may frequently preclude their use (Polzin
et al., 2016b; Sorrell, 2005).
2.2. The economics of energy service contracts
Concepts from transaction cost economics (Furubotn and
Richter, 1997; Rindﬂeisch and Heide, 1997; Shelanski and Klein,
1995; Williamson, 1985) can help explain the conditions under
which an energy service contract is likely to succeed. The follow-
ing summarises the model developed by Sorrell (2005, 2007),2 and
suggests that the inclusion of intermediaries in this model may
improve its explanatory power. Section 4 investigates the impact
of intermediaries on transaction costs in more detail.
It is assumed that the client's primary motive for entering into
an energy service contract is to reduce the (anticipated) total cost
of supplying the relevant useful energy streams and/or ﬁnal en-
ergy services. This cost is the sum of the production costs of pro-
viding these streams/services and the transaction costs associated
with organising or ‘governing’ their provision (Globerman and(footnote continued)
criterion, such as ﬁnancial savings…” In the UK, energy supply contracts (known as
‘contract energy management’) have historically been more common than energy
performance contracts, but this is changing (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016).
2 This in turn builds upon This in turn builds upon Globerman and Vining
(1996) and Vining and Globerman (1999) the transaction costs associated with or-
ganising or ‘governing’ their provision (Globerman and Vining, 1996; Williamson,
1985).
Table 1
Client responsibilities during the contracting process.
Phase Tasks
Project development  Identify options for project goals and scope (e.g. buildings and services covered)
 Assess the technical, economic, legal and organisational feasibility of different project options
 Obtain buy-in from relevant parties
 Explore ﬁnancing options and associated risks
 Collect and analyse relevant data on energy consumption and costs
 Estimate potential project value and anticipated rate of return
Procurement  Draft tender document
 Organise tendering process
 Ensure compliance with national and EU procurement legislation
 Decide selection criteria
 Evaluate bids and negotiate with contractors
 Select preferred supplier
 Develop, negotiate and ﬁnalise details of energy service contract
Installation  Liaise with contractor to ensure delivery on time and to speciﬁcation
 Co-operate with contractor to resolve unanticipated difﬁculties
Operation  Oversee monitoring, veriﬁcation and reporting of energy savings, together with overall contract performance
 Negotiate changes and modiﬁcations to contract if and when required
 Resolve any disputes with contractor
C. Nolden et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 420–430422Vining, 1996; Williamson, 1985).
The production costs include: the capital costs of any replace-
ment energy conversion, distribution and control equipment (in-
cluding ﬁnancing costs); the staff costs associated with audits and
project design; the staff and material costs associated with
equipment operation and maintenance; and the purchase cost of
energy commodities. Prior to signing the contract these costs are
borne directly by the client, while subsequent to signing the
contract these costs are largely borne by the contractor and re-
covered through the contract fees.
There are two main reasons why contracting can lower the
production costs of energy services. First, contractors beneﬁt from
economies of scale, scope and specialisation, in that they have
greater technical, commercial, legal and managerial expertise in
the provision of energy services than their clients; their staff can
simultaneously manage a number of client sites; and they can
frequently access ﬁnance, equipment and energy commodities at
lower cost. Second, the process of outsourcing involves market
competition which gives contractors a strong incentive to bid close
to the marginal cost of energy service supply - unlike in-house
provision where inefﬁciencies and monopolistic pricing may pre-
vail. The scope for ex-post inefﬁciencies is constrained by perfor-
mance incentives within the contract and the threat of switching
contractors (although the latter may not always be feasible).
Any savings in production costs will be offset by the transaction
costs incurred by both client and contractor in preparing, nego-
tiating, establishing, executing, monitoring and enforcing the
contract (Globerman and Vining, 1996; Sorrell, 2005, 2007; Vining
and Globerman, 1999). These contracts will necessarily be ‘in-
complete’ in that they will not specify the actions to be taken in all
circumstances and since it is not possible to fully monitor the
behaviour of the other party, there is a risk that one party will act
opportunistically to the detriment of the other (Williamson, 1985).
Transaction costs will also be incurred for in-house provision of
energy services, but these are typically smaller and often more
hidden.
The transaction costs incurred by both client and contractor
may be usefully subdivided into:
 the search costs associated with tendering, identifying a poten-
tial client or contractor, verifying their suitability, preparing and
evaluating bids and selecting a preferred contracting partner; the bargaining costs associated with negotiating and preparing
the contract, monitoring contract performance, enforcing com-
pliance, negotiating changes to the contract when unforeseen
circumstances arise and resolving disputes; and
 the opportunism costs associated with either party acting in bad
faith - for example by claiming that cost reductions derive from
performance improvements when their real origin lies else-
where (Vining and Globerman, 1999).
Contracting will be viable for the client when the saving in
production costs outweighs the increase in transaction costs. Si-
milarly, it will be viable for the contractor when contract revenues
exceed the production and transaction costs incurred while also
allowing for an appropriate rate of return. For both conditions to
hold, the overall saving in production costs must exceed the
overall increase in transaction costs for both parties combined
(Sorrell, 2005, 2007).
Both the potential for reducing production costs and the as-
sociated transaction costs will vary between different contexts,
clients and energy services. However, this complexity can be re-
duced to a limited number of variables that are summarised in
Annex A (Sorrell, 2005, 2007). This model suggests that contract-
ing may be more viable for ‘medium-sized’ sites where the po-
tential for energy cost saving is reasonably large, but contractors
still have scale, scope and specialisation advantages over in-house
provision (Sorrell, 2005, 2007).
This theoretical model appears incomplete, however, as it ne-
glects contextual factors that could help explain why similar or-
ganisations in different sectors have different probabilities of
contract adoption. While a number of factors may be relevant, the
availability or otherwise of intermediation services, such as those
provided by the PPFs, appears to be of particular importance.
The term intermediation services is used rather loosely in the
literature, but may be deﬁned as activities by third parties that
help buyers and sellers meet and transact. Intermediaries can fa-
cilitate and coordinate transactions, reduce information asymme-
tries between buyers and sellers, reduce risk and provide guar-
antees of product quality. As Spulber (1996) notes, intermediaries
“provide the underlying microstructure of most markets” and in-
clude organisations such as retailers, wholesalers, ﬁnancial bro-
kers, credit agencies, real estate agents and insurance agents. For a
product as complex as an energy service contract, intermediaries
C. Nolden et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 420–430 423are necessarily highly specialised and have only emerged relatively
recently.
Despite their important contribution to market functioning,
intermediaries remain relatively neglected in the economics lit-
erature (Spulber, 1996). Notable exceptions include Biglaiser
(1993), who shows how introducing ‘middlemen’ in a market with
adverse selection can improve efﬁciency, Biglaiser and Friedman
(1994) who show how intermediaries can guarantee product
quality and reduce moral hazard, and Li (1998) who shows how
the contribution of intermediaries depends on the degree of
asymmetric information between producer and consumer, as well
as the cost of verifying product quality. These theoretical models
are complemented by a number of empirical studies of particular
commodity markets (e.g. Wang, 1999) and a growing literature on
electronic intermediaries (e.g. Barnes and Hinton, 2007; Brous-
seau, 2002). But little attention has been paid to intermediaries
within the energy policy literature and the only study of inter-
mediaries for energy service contracts is by Bleyl et al. (2013), who
show how ‘facilitators’ can overcome a variety of obstacles to
contracting within the client organisation. Give the growing im-
portance of intermediaries for energy service contracts it seems
useful to explore their nature and contribution in more detail and
to reﬂect this within the theoretical model.3. Methods and data
The empirical study is based upon information compiled dur-
ing 2014–15 from primary and secondary literature and semi-
structured interviews with 23 sector representatives. The choice of
elite interviews is justiﬁed for this topic, since there are only a
small number of energy service contractors in the UK and an
equally small number of informed market observers (Nolden and
Sorrell, 2016). The interviews sought to establish the current status
of the UK energy service market, the drivers and barriers to market
growth, the factors explaining the relative success of energy ser-
vice contracts for different types of client, the contribution of
policy initiatives to this success and the future prospects for the
market. The interviews were used to corroborate evidence derived
from documentary sources and to contribute to the development
of explanations for the empirical patterns observed.
The interviewees had a variety of overlapping expertise, and
included monitoring and veriﬁcation (M&V) experts (2), ﬁnance
experts (2), ESCO representatives (8), market analysts (3), pro-
curement framework representatives (4), public procurement ex-
perts (2), trade body representatives (1), local authority re-
presentatives (2) and policy makers (2). Most interviewees were
asked how the PPFs were operating, what successes they had
achieved and what factors explained that success. Interviews were
conducted face-to-face or via telephone and lasted between 30
and 90 min. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, except in
cases where topics were commercially sensitive.3 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.
4 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.
5 Interview with monitoring and veriﬁcation expert, 2014.
6 See for example: http://www.european-energy-service-initiative.net/eu/pro
ject.html.
7 Interview with energy service company representative, 2014.4. Findings and discussion
The section summarises the main ﬁndings and uses quotes
from the interviews to illustrate those ﬁndings. Section 4.1 iden-
tiﬁes the need for intermediaries and describes how the UK public
procurement frameworks are meeting that need. Section 4.2
summarises the experience with these frameworks up to 2015,
including their achievements, similarities and differences. Section
4.2 explores the economics of intermediation in more detail,
drawing upon the theoretical ideas summarised in Section 2.2. The
focus throughout is on the public sector, since intermediation
services have yet to extend to the private sector.4.1. Public procurement frameworks for energy service contracts
Comprehensive energy service contracts are complex (e.g.
DECC, 2015a), and their use requires the client to engage sig-
niﬁcant technical, legal, project management, ﬁnancial and ad-
ministrative expertise. This means that the transaction costs of
establishing a contract can be high:
“…. [energy service contracting] is tough to do. It is really hard
work. It's transaction costs. It's resources. It's time. You need
staff with time. You need to make sure when the ESCO supplies
you with the M&V report that you understand the baseline.
Some clients look at it and say ‘it's ﬁne’ but they really have no
idea. I know they are saving because I check everything. But
they have no time…..”3
“…. The problem is that energy performance contracts are
complicated. We need to ensure that somebody understands
the M&V, how you measure the guarantee, how you do re-
conciliation, how you establish a baseline….. We realised that
[public sector clients] didn’t have the resources internally to do
this type of project…..”4
For a variety of reasons, there has been little progress towards
standardising energy service contracts in the UK:
“… There is no single dominant energy performance contract in
the UK. It varies very much in terms of size, type of building,
type of client, length.… Because the market is expanding there
isn’t enough standardisation…. We are literally seeing every
single type of contract…”5
Bespoke contracts provide diversity and adaptability, but are
time-consuming to negotiate and establish and require the client
to engage signiﬁcant legal expertise. Standardised contracts offer
the potential to reduce transaction costs, while standardised
methods for monitoring and veriﬁcation can reassure clients and
reduce risk for lenders. European and national policy measures to
encourage contracting have therefore focused upon encouraging
standardisation and disseminating best practice, with the aim of
increasing conﬁdence in the contracting model and reducing
transaction costs for inexperienced clients (DECC, 2015a; 2015b;
Shonder et al., 2010; Staničić et al., 2014).6 But such top-down
initiatives have proved relatively ineffective, perhaps because they
lack the speciﬁcity to be useful for individual clients. As one in-
terviewee observed:
“…..[national guidelines] are not doing anything as far as I can
see. They sit in ivory towers saying this is how it should be
done. But how many contracts have you done? Show me your
method. Explain why you are doing it that way. Every time you
stick a bunch of engineers in the room, they will come up with
a different set of guidelines….”7
Clients can obtain more speciﬁc and targeted assistance from
private consultancy companies, but these services can be ex-
pensive and consultants often lack expertise in the public sector.
Public procurement frameworks for energy service contracts
(PPFs) help to overcome these challenges by combining three se-
parate but interlinked functions:
First, they provide a recognised legal framework for procuring
energy service contracts in speciﬁc parts of the public sector that
complies with the relevant UK and EU procurement legislation and
Box 1–The contracting process facilitated by the Carbon and
Energy Fund
1. A client expresses interest in the CEF and shares the scope
of its proposed scheme with CEF staff, supported by
relevant documentation such as their estates strategy and
an outline business case.
2. CEF staff visit the client, meet with their estates, finance
and procurement teams and explain the CEF process.
3. CEF staff assist the client in outlining the feasibility of the
scheme, including the anticipated capital investment,
annual payments and guaranteed savings.
4. The client joins the CEF, and the latter commits to support
the client through the life of the contract.
5. The CEF organises a mini competition, asking its member
contractors to express their interest in the project.
6. The interested contractors are invited to an open day at
which the client and the CEF explain the project.
7. Interviews are held, at which the contractors present their
initial ideas, together with their record, approach and
financial model.
8. The client selects up to four contractors that it would like
to work with, and holds one-to-one discussions with each.
9. The CEF assists the client in issuing an invitation to tender
to the four contractors. Each contractor provides a bid.
10. The CEF works with client to evaluate the bids and choose
the one that offers best value for money.
11. The winning contractor is given three months to complete
the design and technical schedules. If the contract meets
the original price and guaranteed savings, the client will
sign. If not, the client will cover the costs incurred by the
contractor in preparing the design.
12. The installation phase begins and may last up to a year.
The CEF chairs monthly technical and project board
meetings to help the client manage the installation and
works with the client to assess the technical and financial
performance of the project.
13. Once the project is approved, the client starts payments to
the contractor. The CEF monitors the project performance
and verifies the energy and cost savings. The contractor
reimburses the client if savings are less than those
guaranteed in the contract.
14. The CEF charges no fees to the client, but recovers its
costs by taking a portion of the guaranteed savings in the
contract.
C. Nolden et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 420–430424allows a number of pre-qualiﬁed contractors to bid for each con-
tract. These ‘framework agreements’ set out the terms and con-
ditions under which clients can establish energy service contracts
with the qualifying contractors throughout the period of the
agreement (typically four years). The agreement is advertised in
the Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union (OJEU), but the in-
dividual tenders are not - thereby avoiding the associated delays
and costs.
Second, they establish organisations that act as intermediaries
between clients and contractors and provide dedicated, profes-
sional and informed assistance to clients at each stage of the
contracting process - including the organisation of tendering and
the selection of preferred bidders. In this role, the intermediaries
can encourage learning from one contract to another, increase
trust between the relevant parties and reduce the costs faced by
both client and contractor in establishing and executing the
contract.
Third, the same organisations may also promote energy service
contracts to potential clients. For example, they may disseminate
case studies,8 organise seminars with relevant parties, organise
site visits to successful contracts, facilitate access to speciﬁc
funding sources, develop model contracts targeted at particular
subsectors, promote or operate standardised monitoring and ver-
iﬁcation (M&V) schemes, engage with key stakeholders and liaise
with central government on relevant legislation and guidance.
Framework agreements are a common feature of public sector
procurement and generally set out terms and conditions under
which speciﬁc purchases or contracts (‘call offs’) can be made
(OGC, 2008).9 The agreements are not contracts, but the process of
establishing them is subject to EU procurement rules. In the UK,
the use of framework agreements for complex, non-standard en-
ergy service contracts is relatively novel, as is the establishment of
associated organisations for facilitating those contracts. But there
are a number of precedents in other member states including the
Energy Saving Partnership in Berlin and the Federal Contracting
Campaign in Austria (Bleyl et al., 2013).
Both the UK PPFs and other intermediaries are established by
public authorities and employ staff with procurement expertise in
relevant parts of the public sector - a combination that makes
them attractive to clients in that sector. The cost of intermediation
is recouped from the client and/or contractor - for example
through a ﬁxed fee or a percentage of annual cost savings. These
costs vary with the size and nature of the contract, the range of
services offered and the commercial orientation of the relevant
intermediaries. Our research suggested that fees in the UK range
from 2% to 10% of project capital costs, while a survey of 34 fa-
cilitated contracts in different Member States suggested a mean
ﬁgure of 3% (Bleyl et al., 2013).
The value of intermediation to clients is illustrated by the fol-
lowing quote from the Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF) - a PPF
operating primarily in the UK public health sector:
“….. CEF was born out of frustration……to halt the excessive
expenditure by Trusts in procuring energy performance con-
tracts. Traditionally, public sector bodies would complete
stand-alone procurements so contracts had to be purchased,
consultants employed and contractors procured and once it
was complete all the knowledge was lost. Then after8 See for example: https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/environment/en
ergy/energy-buildings/reﬁt/reﬁt-london-case-studies.
9 Deﬁned in the EU Public Sector Procurement Directive (2004/18/EEC) as “…
An agreement or other arrangement between one or more contracting authorities
and one or more economic operators which establishes the terms… under which
the economic operator will enter into one or more contracts with the contracting
authority in the period during which the framework agreement applies.…”.construction the schemes typically started to underperform
due to a lack of ﬁnance, contractual awareness and knowledge
if things didn’t go as well as expected. The CEF was created as a
place to capture knowledge and to simplify the process so it
could be repeated time and time again….”10The nature and level of support that is provided to clients
varies from one PPF to another and also from one contract to an-
other. The CEF can afford to provide substantial support (Box 1),
since the majority of its contracts relate to large-scale, energy in-
frastructure investments with a typical capital investment of d5
million. Lower levels of support are found for smaller scale pro-
jects, but many of the principles are common all PPFs.10 CEF website (http://www.carbonandenergyfund.net/).
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Table 3
Contractors participating in UK public procurement frameworks for energy service
contracts.
Company CEF RE: FIT Essentia P-EPC
Ameresco *
Bilﬁnger *
Bouygues * *
Breathe Energy (MCW) * * *
British Gas * *
Cofely * * *
Cynergin * *
Doosan Babcok *
EDF * *
ENER-G * *
E.On * * *
Honeywell * *
Imtech * * *
Kier *
Mitie * *
Norland *
Schneider Electrica
Skanska * *
SSE *
Veolia (previously Dalkia) *
Vital Energi *
Willmott Dixon *
Note: CEF has procured three frameworks with a different mix of ESCOs in each.
a Schneider Electric appears in the list as it has it was contracted through
Ecovate to undertake an EPC at King’s College Hospital in 2013.
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There were ﬁve PPFs operating in the UK in 2015: two devel-
oped by local authorities (RE:FIT and Peterborough's EPC frame-
work, henceforth P-EPC) and three developed for the National
Health Service (NHS) (Carbon and Energy Fund, Essentia and
Ecovate). Table 2 summarises these frameworks while Table 3 lists
the contractors participating within each. Although we do not
have reliable estimates of the share of UK contracts facilitated by
these PPFs, nearly all our interviewees emphasised their im-
portance in stimulating recent market growth – with RE: FIT and
the CEF playing the biggest role. The success of RE: FIT in London
has led to a similar model being developed for all of England and
Wales and has also provided the basis for model contracts and
guidance notes published by the UK government (DECC, 2015a;
2015b).
Below we summarise the main features of each PPF, their
achievements up to the end of 2015 and their key similarities and
differences.
4.2.1. Carbon and energy fund
The Carbon and Energy Fund (CEF) is the oldest and largest PPF
in the UK and primarily operates in the National Health Service
(NHS) – which has an annual energy bill of more than d750 million
across 12000 sites (2300 hospitals), ageing infrastructure, diverse
loads, 24-h operation on many sites, and signiﬁcant backlog
maintenance (GIB, 2014).11 The CEF was created in 2011 to support
NHS Trusts in meeting their cost and carbon reduction targets and
it funds, facilitates, manages and monitors complex energy infra-
structure upgrades. Whilst focusing primarily on the health sector,
the CEF is now expanding its activities to large sites in other parts
of the public sector, including universities and local authorities.
Most CEF projects involve large scale investment in CHP, boiler11 The Green Investment Bank estimates that the NHS could reduce energy
costs by d150million/year through investments with paybacks of less than 10 years,
requiring capital investment of up to d1.5 billion.
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systems, lighting and a variety of energy efﬁciency measures.
Projects have a minimum size of d1 million and a typical size of d6
million, with the largest being a d36 million project at Adden-
brookes Hospital, Cambridge. Developing such projects requires
close corporation between contractors and clients and typically
involves 7–9 CEF staff (Box 1). Unlike the other PPFs, the CEF also
takes responsibility for monitoring and verifying energy savings
throughout the life of the project. Since most NHS clients have
limited scope for borrowing (especially for large, capital-intensive
projects), the CEF combines a framework agreement and inter-
mediation services with the provision of off-balance sheet ﬁnan-
cing from a variety of sources. On average, 4–6 of the CEF's 16 pre-
approved contractors bid for individual projects, typically guar-
anteeing either unit price or energy cost savings of 20% or more
over periods of 15–25 years. By the end of 2015, the CEF had fa-
cilitated or was developing more than 50 projects amounting to
over d250 m in capital value, and was planning to substantially
increase investment over the next few years.
4.2.2. RE:FIT
RE: FIT was launched by the Greater London Authority (GLA) in
2008 and was partly modelled on US experience, including the
retroﬁt of the Empire State Building. It began with a pilot phase
covering 42 buildings which has since been followed by two fur-
ther phases of increasing size and ambition. The current target is
to retroﬁt 40% of London's public sector ﬂoor-space by 2025 (GLA,
2015).
In contrast to CEF, most RE: FIT projects are ﬁnanced by clients
who have access to low-cost loans from sources such as Salix12 and
the London Energy Efﬁciency Fund (LEEF).13 There are twelve ap-
proved contractors in the current phase (Table 3), of which 4–6
typically bid for a contract. Capital expenditures range from d150k
to d6 million, with an average of d1 million, and projects typically
deliver 15–20% energy savings with a payback period of 5–7 years.
Phasing of projects is common, through including additional
buildings over time. Contractors are responsible for monitoring
and veriﬁcation but are required to use a standard protocol (Ber-
toldi and Kromer, 2006).14 Contractors are also required to employ
more than one energy-saving measure,15 but most projects focus
on measures with high rates of return.
RE: FIT's intermediary organisation – the Programme Devel-
opment Unit (PDU) - was established with the help of a d2.7
million grant from the European Investment Bank and has proved
critical for the scheme's success. By end 2015, over 50 contracts
had been signed involving over 200 public sector bodies including
the majority of London boroughs, 26 NHS organisations, central
government ofﬁces, libraries and museums. The total capital in-
vestment of d93 million is estimated to have saved around d6
million/year in energy costs.16 RE: FIT is also extending the ap-
proach to schools via bundled, multi-site contracts supported by
interest-free loans from Salix. This is the ﬁrst time energy service12 Funded by the UK government, Salix is a not-for-proﬁt organisation offering
interest-free loans to UK public sector organisations for energy efﬁciency projects
that meet certain criteria. Since 2004, Salix has invested d420 million in over
13,000 projects, leading to annual energy cost savings in excess of d108 million.
13 LEEF has d100 m from the European Regional Development Fund and the
London Green Fund to lend to public or private sector projects that promote energy
efﬁciency.
14 The International Performance Monitoring and Veriﬁcation Protocol
(IPMVP).
15 “…. Part of the framework is that you cannot do just one measure. It has to
be a bundle of measures because we don’t want everybody to just do lighting
because otherwise they wouldnot consider the big stuff……” (Interview with
procurement framework representative, 2014).
16 https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/environment/energy/energy-build
ings/reﬁt.contracts have been used for UK schools, and the target is to ret-
roﬁt over 200 schools in three years.
The GLA is now collaborating with Local Partnerships17 to ex-
tend the RE: FIT model to all public sector organisations in England
and Wales. Launched in 2016, RE: FIT Local Partnerships involves a
larger number of contractors (16), includes more extensive mar-
keting activities and promises an increased focus on more in-
novative energy efﬁcient technologies. Early clients include Cam-
bridgeshire County Council, Hull City Council and the University of
Kent.
4.2.3. Essentia
Established in 2012, Essentia developed out of the capital
projects and estates functions of Guys and St Thomas NHS Foun-
dation Trust - which includes one of the largest and busiest
teaching hospitals in London. Essentia takes an integrated ap-
proach to managing the Trust's infrastructure, including activities
such as energy, waste, IT and transport, and has expanded its ac-
tivities to support clients in other parts of the public sector. Es-
sentia's development of a procurement framework for energy
service contracts is therefore linked to this broader and rapidly
expanding set of business activities. Essentia's target market is
similar to CEF's, and by end 2015 it had facilitated twelve energy
service contracts involving capital investment of d65 million (an
average project size of d5.4 million). These were delivering an
average of 17% energy savings and cost savings of approximately
d8 million/year. There are eight approved contractors under the
framework, of which typically half bid for each project. Monitoring
and veriﬁcation is undertaken by the contractors themselves.
4.2.4. Ecovate
Ecovate Innovations Ltd manages a procurement framework on
behalf of Kings College NHS Foundation Trust - another large
London teaching hospital. This was created in 2013 as a national
framework for ‘Energy, carbon, and backlog maintenance man-
agement services’18 throughout the public sector in England and
Wales. The initial project at Kings involved capital investment of
d8 million, leading to a 9% reduction in annual energy expenditure,
a major reduction in backlog maintenance and improved working
environment for patients and staff. Ecovate chooses contractors
from a maximum of eight of the UK's ‘most accomplished ESCOs’,
and uses a collaborative approach where contractors work in
partnership with clients to develop the most appropriate project
scope.
4.2.5. P-EPC
Peterborough City Council has established a wholly-owned
subsidiary (Blue Sky Peterborough) to develop a range of energy
and carbon saving initiatives, including partnering with British Gas
to deliver energy efﬁciency improvements to households and
setting up a scheme to negotiate energy supply contracts for
groups of consumers. Established in 2013, the procurement fra-
mework forms part of these activities and - unlike the other fra-
meworks - involves only a single contractor (Honeywell Building
Solutions). The framework is of a ‘partnering nature’ where the
two parties are “… required to work together in a spirit of good
faith and cooperation…”. (Peterborough City Council, 2013) The
framework facilitated the negotiation of a 15-year contract for
Peterborough Council buildings (including the town hall, swim-
ming pool, leisure centre and library) which aims to achieve 15–17 Local Partnerships is jointly owned by the Local Government Association and
the UK Treasury and specialises in the delivery of a wide range of public services
and infrastructure. Its activities are funded by fees from local authorities and
central government.
18 http://www.publictenders.net/node/2321460.
21 Interview with monitoring and veriﬁcation expert, 2014.
22 Examples include the contract at Tower Hamlets College which includes
atrium roof replacement and boiler replacement (15 year payback) and the contract
at Goldsmiths College which includes wall cladding, double glazing and a district
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The framework is open to other local authorities and educational
establishments within the East, South-East and Midlands, but only
a few contracts have been facilitated to date. As with RE: FIT, P-EPC
is targeting schools through multi-site contracts that aim to de-
liver an average 20% reduction in energy consumption.
4.2.6. Comparing the frameworks
The frameworks currently operating in the UK fall into two
groups: RE: FIT and P-EPC primarily target local authority
buildings, leading to smaller projects with shorter contract
lengths and higher rates of return; while CEF, Essentia and
Ecovate primarily target hospitals, leading to larger projects with
longer contract lengths and lower rates of return. All the frame-
works offer energy performance contracts, but the larger, hos-
pital-based projects frequently include the upgrade and re-
placement of large-scale energy supply infrastructure. All of the
frameworks remain primarily focused upon their core markets,
although they are attempting to expand into other parts of the
public sector.
The type of services offered varies from one framework to
another, together with the associated fees – with Essentia and
Ecovate operating a more commercial model. The CEF offers the
most extensive services, reﬂecting their comparatively large
projects. Overall, the scale of projects range from straightfor-
ward lighting upgrades at schools with an energy bill of less
than d5k/year, to the development of the d36 million Energy
Centre at Addenbrookes. Although the cost of intermediation
makes it less viable for smaller projects, the frameworks have
overcome this constraint to some degree by developing bun-
dled, multisite contracts and facilitating simpliﬁed, ‘off-the-
shelf’ solutions.
The process of establishing contracts also varies from one fra-
mework to another, including the relative emphasis on pre-
scriptive energy-savings targets, versus a more open, ﬂexible and
negotiated approach. While the latter can encourage innovation, it
is also more resource intensive and hence better suited to larger
projects (Box 1).
While four of the frameworks allow prequaliﬁed contractors to
compete for each contract, P-EPC is unique in creating a partner-
ship arrangement between the local authority and a single con-
tractor. This sacriﬁces the beneﬁts of competition, but may offer
compensating beneﬁts through encouraging long-term, trust-
based relationships that could reduce the need for formal con-
tractual provisions (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Chiles and
McMackin, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).
The frameworks also differ in their sources of ﬁnance, reﬂecting
the different characteristics of their target markets. Larger projects
often use off-balance-sheet ﬁnance from a range of sources such as
commercial banks and the UK’s Green Investment Bank, while
smaller projects may be ﬁnanced from revenue and maintenance
budgets. The health service faces greater borrowing constraints
than local authorities, and the latter have beneﬁted from low-cost
sources such as the Public Works Loan Boards. Most interviewees
considered that the availability of ﬁnance was not a major obstacle
to energy service contracts in the UK:
“…. Finance is not an issue. No problem. If you want ﬁnance
there is RBS, there is Siemens, there is LEEF, there are pots
everywhere..…”19
“…if you have a viable business plan with robust M&V, you
should not have any trouble accessing ﬁnance…”20
“…. When people tell you that ﬁnance is problem - it is not a19 Interview with energy service company representative, 2014.
20 Interview with energy service company representative, 2014.problem…”21
While each of the frameworks have been successful in ex-
ploiting ‘low hanging fruit’, the inclusion of innovative technolo-
gies and measures with longer paybacks is comparatively rare.22
This is partly because there are many low-cost opportunities still
available (“….we are tackling the buildings that have had nothing
done over the last 50 years….”23), and partly because of the costs
and risks associated with innovative measures:
“….we go for things that have been tried and tested, and which
the supplier can guarantee with a massive margin because, let's
be honest, if you want them to guarantee something they are
not sure about you are going to put a co-efﬁcient of risk on top
which will cost you a fortune.…When you have innovation, it's
for people who have already done a lot, who have a team inside
who already know….. These people will say ‘you will have to
come up with something new - that's why I’m coming to you.’
That's where we’re driving innovation, but it represents a very
small amount of our projects….” 24
Overall, the frameworks represent a diversity of approaches
that appear well-matched to their target markets and are experi-
encing growing success. The CEF and RE: FIT in particular have
opened up to range of market opportunities over the last ﬁve
years.
4.3. The economics of intermediation for energy service contracts
The success of the intermediaries can be understood with re-
ference to the theoretical model developed in Section 2.2. Speci-
ﬁcally, the intermediaries make contracting more attractive by
reducing the associated transaction costs - to a degree that more
than offsets the associated fees.
Intermediaries provide a standardised contracting process fa-
cilitated by independent and experienced organisations with
sector-speciﬁc expertise that can be expected to act in the client's
interest. Compared to individual clients, intermediaries beneﬁt
from; specialisation economies, since their primary focus is energy
service contracts; scale economies since they deal with multiple
contractors and clients; and learning economies since they carry
forward lessons from one contract to another. The services they
provide can lower search, bargaining and opportunism costs for
both clients and contractors (Brousseau, 2002; Spulber, 1996).
By having an established agreement with a prequaliﬁed group
of contractors, together with a standardised tendering process,
intermediaries lower the search costs for the client in ﬁnding a
suitable contractor, together with the search costs for the con-
tractor in ﬁnding a suitable client. They also reduce the risk that a
suitable match will not be found and that resources will be was-
ted. By providing a single point of contact linking multiple clients
and contractors, and by compiling, ﬁltering and verifying relevant
information, intermediaries simplify the contractor’s problem of
acquiring information about the demand for energy service con-
tracts by different clients, as well as the client's problem of ac-
quiring information about the opportunities and risks of different
types of contract. Comparing multiple bids simultaneously, using a
standardised format with the help of experienced advice lowers
the cost to clients of appraising offers and increases the incentiveheating scheme for 90 buildings that reduces energy consumption by 47% (12 year
payback).
23 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2015.
24 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.
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representative made the following observation about the bidding
strategies of UK contractors:
“…..what [the contractors] will try and do ……is come up with
different names for things so you never really understand what
you are buying.…It's just doing the numbers in a different way
so that you can’t understand them.….. A lot of schemes stall at
that point because [clients] don’t know what on earth they are
buying…….We know, however, because we have simpliﬁed the
whole thing. When they bid in this format there is no way to
hide. You put a capital price in, you put an end price in and it
gives you the level of savings and we can compare
numbers……” 25
By working with a pre-approved list of contractors with ex-
perience in the relevant client sector, an intermediary provides
assurance about the quality of the contractors, together with re-
liable information about the success of similar contracts with
comparable organisations in that sector. In some cases inter-
mediaries organise visits to those organisations, so that potential
clients can gain ﬁrst-hand experience of successful contracts and
talk directly to the people involved. As a result, clients gain con-
ﬁdence in the contracting model (“…We chose RE: FIT because it
was tried and tested…”26) and can afford to spend less time and
effort appraising individual contractors since they can rely on the
reputation of the intermediary instead. Hence, clients become
more willing to both establish a contract and to pay more for
higher quality contracts.
Intermediaries also lower the bargaining costs for the client by
providing standardised tendering and procurement procedures,
along with standardised (where applicable) and legally-compliant
model contracts and sector-speciﬁc energy performance bench-
marks. These signiﬁcantly shorten the time required to negotiate a
contract, while also simplifying the negotiation process and re-
ducing the associated risks:
“……Attached to the framework…..is a call-off contract….with
the providers. They are all preapproved. If you are an organi-
sation you don’t have to negotiate with the suppliers, it's all
preapproved, it's all standard. From the moment you start your
mini competition to getting your contract takes about 8 weeks,
really fast, because they are all preapproved contracts….” 27
“…. We’ve got a standard form of contract, a standardised
process, a standardised framework, a standardised contract.
We’ve got a standard way of doing it and it all conforms with
OJEU and the banks feel comfortable….” 28
“…. It's bundling and simplifying the process. It's productising
the process. It's sort of market evolution. Some contractors
don’t like it. They say there's less chance to innovate. But in
reality there is less chance to get away with stuff…”29
Intermediaries further lower bargaining costs by providing
clients with expert assistance in establishing baseline data, com-
paring with sector benchmarks, deﬁning contract scope, assessing
bids, negotiating with contractors, accessing ﬁnance, monitoring
and verifying energy savings and so on. In all these cases, the
experience and independence of intermediaries leads to a better
outcome for the client. Since intermediaries facilitate multiple
contracts with each contractor they are better placed to assess the
latter's quality and reliability. Intermediaries also have a strong25 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2015.
26 https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/london_school_of_economic
spolitical_scienceuol.pdf.
27 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.
28 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.
29 Interview with procurement framework representative, 2014.incentive to avoid contractual problems and disputes, since this
would negatively affect their reputation and hence the potential
for future contracts. The use of an intermediary therefore reduces
risk for clients, allowing them to spend fewer resources assessing
speciﬁc contract terms.
Intermediaries also reduce the opportunism costs for both
parties by reducing the information asymmetry between client
and contractor, thereby reducing the scope for opportunistic be-
haviour. Opportunism may be further discouraged by the devel-
opment of trust-based relationships between contractors and in-
termediaries, together with the strong incentives the latter have in
maintaining and building their reputation. The intermediaries role
as a ‘gatekeeper’ and enabler of future market opportunities in
priority sectors helps to reinforce the incentives on contractors to
maintain their own reputation and hence to deliver high quality
contracts that beneﬁt clients.
Intermediaries also help extend the contracting model to smaller
clients by facilitating the negotiation of multi-site contracts invol-
ving several different clients - such as a group of schools or area-
based collaborations. Such arrangements aggregate the production
cost savings from multiple sites whilst spreading the transaction
costs between those sites, thereby improving contract viability
(Fig. 2). This approach potentially opens up major market oppor-
tunities, but the feasibility depends upon both the degree of simi-
larity in investment opportunities between the relevant sites and
the degree of cooperation between the relevant clients.
In sum, the intermediaries improve the viability of energy
service contracting by reducing transaction costs for both client
and contractor. Fig. 2 in Annex A reﬂects this by including the
availability of intermediation within the theoretical model out-
lined in Section 2. While the nature and degree of intermediation
varies between different organisations and contracts, the avail-
ability of any of the above services is beneﬁcial for clients. The use
of an intermediary should be preferred to bilateral contracting
when the (anticipated) saving in transaction costs outweighs the
associated intermediation fees for both client and contractor. But
given that many potential clients known relatively little about
energy service contracting, the more common choice is between
using an intermediary to establish a contract and continuing to
provide energy services in-house. Hence, in addition to facilitating
individual contracts, intermediaries also play a critically important
role in raising awareness of contracting opportunities more gen-
erally among different client groups. For many clients, contracting
would never have been considered without the marketing and free
advice provided by the intermediary.5. Conclusions and policy implications
Recent UK experience suggests that the establishment of
intermediaries to facilitate energy service contracts can be an
important driver of the future growth of this market. To date,
the biggest constraint on growth has been the high transaction
costs associated with establishing individual contracts. By ef-
fectively reducing these costs, the UK intermediaries are open-
ing up much wider range of opportunities throughout the public
sector.
Our research was unable to identify the full costs and beneﬁts
of facilitated contracts to individual clients. But the growing suc-
cess of the frameworks in difﬁcult economic conditions, together
with the positive appraisals of the frameworks by the majority of
our interviewees, strongly suggests that this is a viable and at-
tractive approach to unlocking cost-effective energy efﬁciency
improvements. These in turn can relieve the budgetary constraints
on public sector organisations, as well as contributing towards
national climate targets.
Box 2–Determinants of production costs
 Asset specificity: Contracting may be more viable for
generic energy technologies such as boilers, chillers and
lighting systems, but less so for technologies that are
specific to particular sectors and clients such as specialised
industrial processes.
 Economic potential for energy cost saving: Contracting
may be more viable for clients with a large absolute
potential for energy cost savings (in d).
 Aggregate energy costs: Contracting may be more viable
for clients with smaller annual energy bills, since these are
less likely to have dedicated and competent in-house
energy management teams with comparable skills to the
contractor.
 Competitiveness of the energy service market: Contracting
may be more viable when there are multiple, competing
contractors since this should provide stronger incentives
for efficient pricing, as well as more benchmarks against
which to evaluate bids.
Box 3–Determinants of transaction costs
 Asset specificity: Contracting may be less viable when
contractors are required to invest in physical or human
assets that are highly specific to the contract and of little
value in alternative uses. This is because such investments
make the contractor vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour
by the client. To reduce the associated risks, the contractor
will seek a longer contract duration, together with the
inclusion of various protection clauses. Dependence upon
the services provided by the relevant assets may also make
the client vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by the
contractor, since it may be difficult to switch suppliers or to
take energy service provision back in-house.
 Task complexity: Contracting may be less viable when the
tasks associated with providing energy services are
complex. This will make it more difficult and costly to
specify and negotiate contract terms and to monitor
compliance, as well as raising the scope for opportunistic
behaviour by either party. Greater task complexity may
also make the cost and quality of the service more
vulnerable to changes in various internal and external
conditions (e.g. building occupancy, weather conditions)
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policy. The EU Energy Efﬁciency Directive (Council of the European
Union, 2012) requires Member States to promote energy service
contracts throughout the public sector through measures such as
model contracts, guidelines and the dissemination of best practice.
The UK government has followed these recommendations (DECC,
2015a; 2015b, 2015c), but to date, these top-down initiatives ap-
pear to have had little impact upon industry practice. A more ef-
fective approach may be to encourage the bottom-up development
of intermediaries in relevant sectors - for example, through sub-
sidising their start-up costs. The success of the UK frameworks
may be attributed in part to their emergence from individual local
authorities and NHS Trusts and their consequent, in-depth
knowledge of those sectors. The same characteristics may also
explain why the intermediaries have had relatively limited success
to date outside of their core sectors - although this may be be-
ginning to change.30 This success of RE: FIT in particular has en-
couraged the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change to
support the roll-out of a larger programme across England and
Wales (RE: FIT Local Partnerships), and has encouraged the Welsh
government to support the development of a similar programme
in Wales (RE: FIT Cymru). Both initiatives look highly promising
and could provide a model for other EU member states.
Despite this growing success, our research found little evidence
that intermediaries had extended beyond the public sector to the
industrial and commercial sectors. Since intermediaries should
also be able to lower transaction costs in these sectors, their ab-
sence remains a puzzle. However, contracting is poorly suited to
many industrial energy uses, since these often either speciﬁc to
the sector or critical to production (Sorrell, 2005). Similarly, con-
tracting faces major obstacles in the commercial ofﬁce sector
owing to the prevalence of split incentives between landlords and
tenants. These problems may partly explain why industry and
commerce account for only a small proportion of the global mar-
ket for energy performance contracts: for example, they only ac-
count for 15% in the US, with commercial ofﬁces accounting for
only 6% (Larsen et al., 2012). In this context, the potential for in-
termediaries to lower transaction costs may be insufﬁcient to
stimulate market growth since other barriers may be more sig-
niﬁcant. In addition, much of the expertise of the existing inter-
mediaries is speciﬁc to the UK public sector (e.g. procurement
legislation) and this expertise may be less useful in the private
sector.
In a similar manner, our research found little evidence that
energy service contracts have moved beyond well-established
technologies to deliver innovative solutions with lower rates of
return. Hence, if the goal is to signiﬁcantly expand the market in
the industrial and commercial sectors, to deliver deep retroﬁts of
buildings or to accelerate the diffusion of innovative energy-efﬁ-
cient technologies, additional policies and business models are
likely to be required.
In conclusion, intermediaries are playing an increasingly im-
portant role in expanding the market for energy service contracts,
both in the UK and in other countries. They therefore deserve
much greater attention from researchers, as well as speciﬁc en-
couragement from policymakers.which can be difficult to measure and control for.
 Competitiveness of the energy service market: Contracting
may be less viable when there are fewer credible
competitors, since this creates a stronger incentive for
opportunistic behaviour during contract bidding and
negotiation. Weak competition also increases the risk ofAcknowledgements
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(Box 2, Box 3).opportunistic behaviour during contract execution, since it
makes it harder to switch suppliers either prematurely or at
the point of contract renewal.
Fig. 2. Determinants of the viability of an energy service contract.
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